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BANKRUPTCY COURTS AS FORUMS FOR DETERMINING
THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS
T. A. SMEDLEY*
After a penitent insolvent has been redeemed from his financial
sins by the grace of a discharge in bankruptcy, he is likely to as-
sume, with some reason, that the bankruptcy court, as his original
deliverer, will stand as his protector against attempts of creditors
to collect supposedly discharged claims.' Twenty years ago, in
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,2 the Supreme Court of the United States
confirmed the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts to take action
to effectuate discharge orders, and upheld the issuance of an injunc-
tion to restrain a creditor from suing in a state court to enforce
a discharged claim. Though the Court employed rather broad terms
in declaring this jurisdiction to exist,3 the opinion also contained
some restrictive language,- and the specific situation on which the
Hunt decision turned is one of rare occurrence. Under the uncer-
tainty as to the scope of the principle laid down by that decision,
both creditors and bankrupts have since had occasion to contend
that bankruptcy courts can and should-or cannot and should not,
as the interests of the particular party- dictated--determine the dis-
chargeability of specific debts. For two decades, then, this issue has
been argued, somewhat inconclusively, both in and out of the courts.
Perhaps the trouble really began when the federal courts early
laid down the rule that the right to and effect of a discharge are dis-
tinct matters, and that while a bankruptcy court must determine
whether the bankrupt is entitled to a general discharge, the effect
of the discharge as to any particular debt is a matter for any court
*Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University.
1. "Truly, when a bankrupt obtains a discharge he has the right to look
to the dispensing court to protect him and to 'effectuate its orders of adjudi-
cation and discharge.'" Nadler, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy, 27
J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 75, 78 (1953).
For sad tales about such misguided bankrupts, see Beneficial Loan Co. v.
Noble, 129 F. 2d 425 (10th Cir. 1942) and In re Zilliox (S.D. Cal. 1953),
28 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 92 (1954).
2. 292 U. S. 234 (1934).
3. "That a federal court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill ancillary to an
original case or proceeding in the same court, whether in law or in equity, to
secure or preserve the fruits and advantages of a judgment or decree rendered
therein, is well settled... And we find nothing, either in the nature of the
bankruptcy court or in the terms of the Bankruptcy Act, which necessitates
the application of what would amount to a special rule on this subject in
respect of bankruptcy proceedings." Id. at 239-240.
4. "It does not follow, however, that the court was bound to exercise its
authority. And it probably would not and should not have done so except
under unusual circumstances such as here exist." Id at 241.
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in which the creditor seeks to enforce his claim.5 Apparently con-
ceived in the desire to reduce the load of litigation in the federal
courts6 and to expedite the administration of bankrupt estates, 7
the rule was adhered to with staunch regularity in the lower federal
courts. Thus, even after a debtor had received his discharge, he was
not secure against being sued in the state courts on his pre-bank-
ruptcy debts." The order is issued in general terms declaring that
the bankrupt is "discharged from all debts and claims which are
made provable ... against his estate, except such debts as are, by
[Section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act] excepted from the operation of
a discharge in bankruptcy." Further, though Section 17a declares
that a discharge "shall release" the bankrupt from his debts, the rule
has long been followed that the release is effective only if asserted as a
defense to the enforcement of a debt, and that the defense is waived
unless affirmatively pleaded by the bankrupt.'" A creditor of a dis-
charged bankrupt could, therefore, still proceed with an action in a
state court to enforce his claim, hoping that the debt would be held
to be within the exceptions of Section 17a or that the debtor would
fail to plead his discharge in defense. On the other hand, the bank-
5. In re Mirkus, 289 Fed. 732 (2d Cir. 1923) ; Teubert v. Kessler, 296
Fed. 472 (3d Cir. 1924) ; In re Se-:zler, 73 F. Supp. 314 (S.D. Cal. 1947) ;
I Collier, Bankruptcy 1111 17.27, 17.28 (14th ed. 1940) ; 7 Remington, Bank-
ruptcy §§ 3437, 3439 (5th ed. 1939).
This rule is recognized to be subject to two qualifications, apart from
that established by the Hunt case. (1) Section 11a of the Bankruptcy Act
provides: "A suit which is foundel upon a claim from which a discharge
would be a release, and which is pending against a person at the time of the
filing of a petition by or against him, shall be stayed until an adjudication or
the dismissal of the petition ... [and] may be further stayed until the ques-
tion of his discharge is determined.. . ." Under this provision, the bankruptcy
court must, for that purpose, determine the dischargeability of the claim.
In re Millkofsky, 17 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. N.Y. 1936); Hisey v. Lewis-Gale
Hosp., 27 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Va. 1939). See In re Drowne, 124 F. Supp. 842(D. R.I. 1954), in which the court found the claim to be within § 17a and
expressly excepted the claim from the operation of any discharge which might
later be granted. (2) When a provable claim was scheduled in a prior bank-
ruptcy proceeding involving the same debtor, and, for one reason or another,
no discharge was granted, such claim is rendered non-dischargeable in the
later proceeding and will be excepted from the discharge on petition by the
creditor. In re Schwartz, 89 F. 2d 172 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Brack v. Gross, 186 F.
2d 940 (4th Cir. 1951). See discussions in Oglebay, Some Developments in
Bankruptcy Law, 20 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 115 (1946) ; Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1191 (1951).
6. Coleman, A Plea for "One Stop Service" in Bankruptcy, 25 J. N. A.
Ref. Bankr. 31 (1951).
7. Watts v. Ellithorpe, 135 F. 2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1943) ; It re Marshall, 24
F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1938).
8. Hellman v. Goldstone, 161 Fed. 913 (3d Cir. 1908) ; In re Havens,
272 Fed. 975 (2d Cir. 1921).
9. Bankruptcy Form 45.
10. Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942) ; In re Weisberg, 253
Fed. 833 (E.D. Mich. 1918); In re Boardway, 248 Fed. 364 (N.D. N.Y.
1918) ; 7 Remington, Bankruptcy § 3459.
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ruptcy court's incapacity to determine the effect of a discharge on a
particular debt precluded a creditor with even an obviously non-
dischargeable claim from having it expressly exempted in the terms
of the general discharge." His only remedy was to bring suit in
a court of general jurisdiction to enforce his debt and then over-
come the debtor's defense of discharge by proving that this debt
came within the Section 17a exceptions. Under this cumbersome
system, the bankruptcy court issues "a strange form of decree
which must be taken to another court for an interpretation of its
effect." 12 The result was to relieve the bankruptcy court of con-
siderable work and worry, and to throw the parties upon the mercies
of a myriad of state courts for determination of whether the federal
court's decree prevented enforcement of the bankrupt's debts.
LocAL LOAN Co. v. HuNT
Not until 1934 was a substantial breach made in this protective
wall which the bankruptcy courts had erected around themselves.
Then the decision in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt "chartered a new
course by declaring an extension of the jurisdictional boundary of
the bankruptcy court."1 3 The debtor in that case had borrowed $300
from the loan company, and as security for repayment had made an
assignment of wages to be earned. Six months later, he became a
voluntary bankrupt, scheduled the loan among his liabilities, and in
due time received his discharge. One week thereafter, the loan com-
pany brought suit in a Chicago municipal court against the bank-
rupt's employer to enforce the assignment against wages earned
subsequent to the adjudication. Without moving to intervene in that
action, the debtor petitioned the bankruptcy court for an injunction
to prevent the loan company from prosecuting the suit or otherwise
attempting to enforce the claim. The District Court granted the
injunction, which action was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and finally by the Supreme Court, against the specific conten-
tion of the creditor that the bankruptcy court was without jurisdic-
tion in the matter. The Supreme Court, noting that numerous deci-
sions had denied such relief on the ground that the effect of a dis-
charge is to be decided in whatever court the creditor chooses to
sue, quite positively declared that in the case at bar the bankruptcy
court, as a federal court of equity, "has jurisdiction of a bill ancillary
11. It re Marshall Paper Co., 102 Fed. 872 (1st Cir. 1900); In re
Mussey, 99 Fed. 71 (D. Mass. 1900).
12. Twinem, Discharge-What Court Determines the Effect Thereof,
21 . N. A. Ref. Bankr. 33, 34 (1946).
13. Id. at 33.
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to an original case or proceeding in the same court ... to secure
or preserve the fruits and advantages of a judgment or decree
rendered therein ... ."" However, it was quickly added that: "It
does not follow.., that the court was bound to exercise its authority.
And it probably would not and should not have done so except under
unusual circumstances such as here exist."'5 In the Hunt case itself,
the "unusual circumstances" arose from the fact that the established
Illinois law made the wage assignment enforceable against post-
bankruptcy earnings in spite of the general discharge. Though the
contrary view is applied in most states and in the federal courts,
the bankrupt here would have been forced to appeal through the
entire heirarchy of Illinois courts and then to the federal Supreme
Court before he could obtain a correct decision that the assignment
was unenforceable. Under that long and costly course of litigation,
"it is clear that the legal remedy thus afforded would be inadequate
to meet the requirements of justice." 16
It is not quite accurate to assert, as some authorities have done,' 7
that the Hunt decision created an entirely new power in the bank-
ruptcy courts, because in several notable cases lower federal courts
had already in effect exercised the jurisdiction which the Supreme
Court now recognized.'" Nevertheless, both creditors and debtors
reacted promptly and enthusiastically to this new and powerful sanc-
tion of the bankruptcy court's power to determine the discharge-
ability of specific claims. Creditors have hailed the Hunt case as
sustaining the right of the referee expressly to exempt certain debts
when granting a general discharge, 19 while debtors sought to employ
it as authority for enjoining any actions by creditors to enforce debts
in state courts after discharge. On the other hand, some writers
14. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 239 (1934).
15. Id. at 241.
16. Ibid.
17. See Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F. 2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Note,
18 Brooklyn L. Rev. 271, 273 (1952). Glenn, Effect of Discharge in Bank-
ruptcy: Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Court, 30 Va. L. Rev. 531 (1944),
asserts that only one lower federal court case had previously adopted a similar
view.
18. Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, 50 F. 2d 856 (4th Cir.
1931) ; Sims v. Jamison, 67 F. 2d 409 (9th Cir. 1933) ; In re Hunt, 67 F. 2d
998 (7th Cir. 1933), relying on In re Skorcz, 67 F. 2d 998 (7th Cir. 1933)(though the discharge had not yet been issued in the Skorcz case, the court
in the Hunt case declared this difference not to be a legal distinction). In re
Fellows, 43 F. 2d 122 (N.D. Okla. 1930) (discharge not yet granted, but
permanent restraining order was granted, court basing its authority on §
2(15) ; not a proceeding for temporary stay under § lla). See In re Home
Discount Co., 147 Fed. 538, 552-553 (N.D. Ala. 1906).
19. See 1 Collier, Bankruptcy f 17.28 (1953 Supp.); Donnelly, The
Non-Dischargeability of Dischargeable Debts in Bankruptcy, 36 Va. L. Rev.
185, 197 (1950).
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condemned the Supreme Court's attempt to extend the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy courts, and insisted that those tribunals would
refuse to embrace their new-found authority.20
The twenty years which followed have not completely justified
any of those points of view. The lower federal courts have, quite
understandably, put different constructions on the Hunt decision,
and the Supreme Court has not spoken again in the matter.
THE CREDITOR's RIGHTS UNDER THE HUNT CASE RULE
Prior to 1934 there apparently had been little serious contention
that the bankruptcy court, in issuing a general discharge, could
properly exempt specific claims from the effect of the order,21 but the
Hunt case has brought about a change of opinion in that regard. In
the twelve decisions found which pass directly on the issue, the
courts in ten instances appear to have recognized that the power to
make such an exemption exists, though in only four of the cases
was the creditor's request to have the discharge qualified actually
granted.2 2 The opinions do not always yield a clear explanation for
the basis of this jurisdiction; but in most of them general reference
is made to the Hunt case as establishing that the bankruptcy court
has power "to determine whether the bankrupt's discharge is a bar
to a provable debt," 23 or that a "bankruptcy court has inherent
equity jurisdiction to control the effect of its own order of dis-
charge, '24 though in at least one case the court correctly took note
of the fact that the Hunt case actually affords no specific authority
20. Glenn, supra note 17; Note, 28 Va. L. Rev. 650, 651 (1942). It is
interesting to note that Professor Glenn was in a more mellow mood when
he wrote in his treatise on Liquidation that the "reasoning of the court is more
objectionable than the actual decision," which reaches a result that "is useful."
Glenn, Liquidation § 355 (1935).
21. But it re Wernecke, 1 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. N.Y. 1932) took such
action at the creditor's request, without any reference to the basis of the
court's authority to do so.
22. Granting the creditor's request: Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d
588 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Rees v. Jensen, 170 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948) ; It re Zitz-
mann, 46 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. N.Y. 1942); In re Tamburo, 82 F. Supp. 995
(D. Md. 1949). Refusing the creditor's request but recognizing the bank-
ruptcy court's jurisdiction to qualify a discharge: Watts v. Ellithorpe, 135
F. 2d 1 (1st Cir. 1943) ; it re Barber, 140 F. 2d 727 (3d Cir. 1944) ; In re
Hadden, 142 F. 2d 896 (6th Cir. 1944) ; In re Sutton, 19 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.
N.Y. 1937) ; In re Anthony, 42 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. 11. 1941) ; In re Biscoe,
45 F. Supp. 422 (D. Mass. 1952). See Hisey v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., 27 F.
Supp. 20, 25 (W.D. Va. 1939). Denying the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
to qualify a discharge: it re Lowe, 36 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Ky. 1941) ; In re
McCarthy, 45 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. N.Y. 1942). See Francine v. Babayan, 45 F.
Supp. 321, 322 (E.D. N.Y. 1942). Twinem, supra note 12, at 33 states that:
"Quite a number of Referees have already followed the practice of declaring
a particular obligation non-dischargeable."
23. it re Zitzniann, 46 F. Supp. 314, 315 (E.D. N.Y. 1942). Also Harri-
son v. Donnelly, 135 F. 2d 588, 589-590 (8th Cir. 1946).
24. In re Tamburo, 82 F. Supp. 995, 999 (D. Md. 1949).
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for qualifying a discharge at a creditor's request.25 In a few in-
stances this jurisdiction has been found to be an incident of the
basic power of bankruptcy courts to construe and administer the
Bankruptcy Act,26 and in other cases the courts merely recognize
the existence of their power to act without attempting to explain its
source.
On one point there is agreement. This phase of the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court is discretionary, and so a creditor has no right
to have the nature of his claim passed upon. Whether the bankruptcy
court will exercise its discretion to do so is said to depend on
whether there are unusual circumstances in the case at bar which
would lead to some unfairness or special embarrassment to either
creditor or debtor should the issue be left to later settlement in the
state courts, 27 or whether the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act
would be better served by a disposition of the question by the bank-
ruptcy court in making the discharge.28 In the few cases granting
the creditor's petition, the opinions have not been persuasive in
showing special need for action by the bankruptcy court. The pro-
cedure has been to establish the jurisdiction by a broad construction
of the Hunt decision and then to declare that the case at bar presents
a proper situation for the exercise of that jurisdiction.29 One court,
declaring a creditor's judgment obtained after the bankruptcy ad-
judication to be non-dischargeable, found its justification for deter-
mining the issue in the fact that the bankrupt had failed to exercise
his privilege under Section 1 la to have the creditor's suit stayed be-
fore judgment.20 A more reasonable argument, advanced in In re
25. In re Barber, 140 F. 2d 727, 728 (3d Cir. 1944).
26. In re Anthony, 42 F. Supp. 312, 315 (E.D. Ill. 1941) : "Because the
creditor's petition brings into quesion the effect of the court's own order of
discharge, as well as the proper construction and application of the statute,
the conclusion that the subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the court
would seem to be inescapable." See Hisey v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., 27 F. Supp.
20, 25 (W.D. Va. 1939).
27. Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 1946) ; In re
Tamburo, 82 F. Supp. 995, 999 (D. Md. 1949).
28. In re Barber, 140 F. 2d 727, 729 (3d Cir. 1944) ; In re Anthony, 42
F. Supp. 312, 315 (E.D. Ill. 1941).
29. As in Harrison v. Donnelly, 153 F. 2d 588 (8th Cir. 1946). In Rees
v. Jensen, 170 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948) the court seems almost to be con-
fusing the creditor's right to have his specific claim exempted from discharge
with the creditor's right to oppose the granting of a general discharge.
30. In re Zitzmann, 46 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. N.Y. 1942). This reasoning
is unpersuasive, because even if the bankrupt had asserted his rights under
§ 11a, he could at best only have obtained a temporary stay against prosecu-
tion of the pending suit until after his right to discharge was determined. The
bankruptcy court's finding that the debt was dischargeable would not prevent
the creditor from continuing the suit later, nor would it prevent the state
court from ruling that the debt was non-dischargeable. Greenfield v. Tuccillo,
129 F. 2d 854 (2d Cir. 1942) ; In re Millkofsky, 17 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. N.Y.
1936) ; 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 11.04.
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Tamburo,31 is that if the bankruptcy court refused to exempt from
the discharge the judgment already proven by the creditor as a claim
in the bankruptcy proceedings, he would be put to the burden of
again proving in a state court the details of the bankrupt's conduct
out of which the allegedly non-dischargeable liability arose, and
the witnesses might not be available to testify in such later action.
That consideration was made especially significant in the case,
however, by the fact that the judgment in question had been obtained
prior to the bankruptcy in a conversion action in the same federal
district court which now sat as the bankruptcy court.
The courts which have refused to exercise their discretion to
decide whether a creditor's claim should be exempted are more posi-
tive in their reasons. The absence of unusual circumstances is
demonstrated by pointing out that the creditor has adequate reme-
dies in suing in a state court to enforce his claim as within the
class of non-dischargeable debts listed in Section 17a, or in objecting
to the granting of a general discharge on the ground that the bank-
rupt is guilty of offenses listed in Section 14c.3 2 Neither of these
remedies satisfies the creditor, of course, because he hopes to avoid
the trouble, delay and expense of a later state court action on the
debt; and if he should successfully oppose the application for dis-
charge, he would lose the desired advantage of having the bankrupt
in better position to pay this debt for having been released from his
other obligations.33 But several other arguments for denying relief
are advanced. It is said that determination of the dischargeability by
the bankruptcy court would unjustly deprive the debtor of a jury
trial on the issues of fact involved,34 and that little would be gained
by the bankruptcy court's determination because the creditor would
still have to go to a state court to obtain a judgment on his claim
or to obtain execution on a judgment already entered, if the bank-
31. 82 F. Supp. 995, 998 (D. Md. 1949). Note, 36 Va. L. Rev. 84,
87-88 (1950), attempts to discredit Tamburo's reasoning: "Such an argu-
ment would seem rather weak in the face of the fact that the determination
will be made from the pleadings and judgment in the trial court, and human
witnesses are largely unnecessary."
32. Watts v. Ellithorpe, 135 F. 2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1943) ; it re Barber,
140 F. 2d 727 728-729 (3d Cir. 1944) ; In re Hadden, 142 F. 2d 896, 897
(6th Cir. 1945.
33. The courts of course recognize this motive in the creditor's actions:
See In re Barber, 140 F. 2d 727, 729 (3d Cir. 1944) : "A bankruptcy court is not
concerned with the furtherance of, nor may it be required to further, some
particular creditor's private interests or desires. Its duty and, therefore,
its responsibility is to see to the ratable distribution of a bankrupt's property
among his creditors according to their priorities as determined by the Act."
34. Watts v. Ellithorpe, 135 F. 2d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1943) ; In re Anthony,
42 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Ill. 1941) ; In re Biscoe, 45 F. Supp. 422, 423 (D.
Ifass. 1942).
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rupt persisted in his refusal to pay the obligation. 35 Perhaps the most
significant consideration is the danger of delay in the administration
of bankrupt estates. As was aptly observed in In re Biscoe: "If on
the petition of a creditor, the bankruptcy court stops to adjudicate
questions like the one at bar, then the completion of a bankruptcy
case will be delayed and the proceedings made more burdensome
for the estate at the ultimate expense of creditors not directly
involved.'",
From the standpoint of the creditor's interests, it is worth noting
here that in every case found in which a bankruptcy court has
granted a creditor's request to declare a particular debt to be ex-
empted from a general discharge, the creditor had already reduced
his claim to a judgment, either before or after the start of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings.37 On the other hand, in only one of the more
numerous cases denying this relief to the creditor had he obtained
a judgment before the controversy over the discharge arose.38 The
opinions do not stress this factor, and in fact there seems to be no
compelling reason why it should make any difference. The sugges-
tion has been made that where a judgment has been obtained, the
debtor has been afforded an opportunity for a jury trial, and so that
objection to a determination by the bankruptcy court is answered.
Further, it is supposed that the bankruptcy court would reach its
decision on the basis of the record in the state court proceeding,
and so the trouble and delay of holding a full hearing in the matter
would not be experienced. 9 Though the matter of the existence of a
judgment may be merely coincidental, yet the fact remains that the
creditor goes before the bankruptcy court better armed with favor-
able authority if he has already reduced his claim to judgment. He is in
a still stronger position if he has been able to inject into the record
of the trial some proof that the debtor's liability resulted from
willful and malicious injury to the creditor's person or property, or
from some other circumstance placing the claim within the types
35. In re Anthony, 42 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Ill. 1941). This argument
is approved by Note, 28 Va. L. Rev. 650, 651 (1942), but rejected by Coleman,
supra note 6, contending that "There would be an end to litigation" if the
referees were authorized to except debts from a general discharge.
36. In re Biscoe, 45 F. Supp. 422, 423 (D. Mass. 1942). Also, Watts
v. Ellithorpe, 135 F. 2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1943) ; In re Barber, 140 F. 2d 727, 729
(3d Cir. 1944).
37. The first four cases cited in note 22 supra. Also, the pre-Himt case
decision, In re Wernecke, 1 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. N.Y. 1932).
38. In re Lowe, 36 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. Ky. 1941). This is one of the two
cases in which the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to determine whether
a particular claim is discharged was expressly denied.
39. Note, 36 Va. L. Rev. 84, 87-88 (1950).
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made non-dischargeable by Section 17a.40
Though some authorities have argued vigorously for the broader
exercise by the bankruptcy courts of their jurisdiction, at the credi-
tor's request, to exempt certain debts when issuing a general dis-
charge, this writer concludes that the practice is not sound in the
normal run of cases. It is probably true that the bankruptcy court,
being more familiar with bankruptcy law in general and the facts of
the case at bar in particular, is better qualified to pass on discharge-
ability questions than are the state courts; and the honest creditors
with non-dischargeable claims would be saved some time and
expense of prosecuting separate actions in state courts.41 However,
there are stronger considerations demanding that the bankruptcy
court should ordinarily deny the creditor's request for qualification
of the discharge. Certainly, the rule of the Hunt case is not broad
enough to sustain that type of action, because that case dealt with
the power of a bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability
of the debt at the petition of the bankrupt after the issuance of a
general discharge.4 2 Further, the creditor, in contrast with the
debtor, ordinarily has no substantial need for such relief, as he has
available, and knows enough to pursue, the normal remedy of bring-
ing suit in a state court to enforce the obligation. In fact, a declara-
tion of non-dischargeability will often not relieve him from the
necessity of ultimately proceeding in a state court, for the bank-
ruptcy court "cannot carry through and render a judgment upon
a creditor's unreleased claim upon which execution may issue against
the bankrupt's after-acquired assets." 43 A positive reason against
the practice of entertaining petitions for qualifying the discharge
rests in the strong danger that creditors would be inclined to abuse
the privilege by continually clamoring to have their claims exempted
whether or not there actually were sound grounds for arguing that
the liabilities were within the exceptions of Section 17a. The delay in
the administration of the bankrupt estate while these petitions were
being contested would become quite substantial, to the unnecessary
prejudice of both the bankrupt and the creditors waiting to receive
dividends on their dischargeable claims.
40. See Notes, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 88, 90 (1953); 22 Va. L. Rev. 585
(1936) ; 11 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 176, 181 (1954).
41. As contended in Twinem, supra note 12; Coleman, supra note 6.
42. See In re Barber, 140 F. 2d 727, 728 (3d Cir. 1944) ; 1 Collier, Bank-
ruptcy ff 2.62 [5] ; Donnelly, supra note 19, at 195. But this point has not
always been recognized. See Note, 28 Va. L. Rev. 650 (1942), where, re-
ferring to the Hunt case, it is declared: 'As a matter of fact, this is tanta-
mount to acknowledging that a bankruptcy court has the power to decide
whether any particular debt is barred by its order of discharge."
43. In re Anthony, 42 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Ill. 1941).
1955]
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THE BANKRUPT'S RIGHT UNDER THE HUNT CASE RULE
Even greater controversy has arisen as to how broadly Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt should be applied as enabling the bankrupt to
call upon the bankruptcy court to interfere with a creditor's efforts
to enforce a claim in proceedings outside of bankruptcy after a
general discharge has been granted. In spite of the assertions of
critics of the Hunt case that the lower federal courts have been
reluctant to determine matters of dischargeability at the bankrupt's
request,44 the decisions are about evenly divided in granting and
denying relief.
The courts refusing to interfere with a creditor's enforcement
efforts have generally recognized their power to take such action,
but have stressed the part of the Hunt opinion which cautioned
against the exercise of that power "except under unusual circum-
stances such as here exist." Though it might be argued that the
Supreme Court by this phrase meant to restrict the scope of the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to cases involving the same basic
situation as in the Hunt case, even the courts denying relief have
not adopted such a narrow view, but rather have made case-by-case
determinations as to whether "unusual circumstances" existed.
Some variant expressions employed in the opinions help to indicate
the import of that ambiguous concept in the minds of the judges. It
has been said that the bankruptcy court will not interfere on
behalf of the debtor unless the state court remedy is inadequate, 5 or
unless the failure of the bankruptcy court to act will cause "special
embarrassment"46 or "irreparable injury" to the bankrupt, 47 or un-
less there are "special conditions" calling for intervention,4s or un-
less action by the bankruptcy court is necessary "to effectuate.., its
order of discharge"4 9 or "to prevent the defeat or impairment of its
jurisdiction." 50
44. Glenn, supra note 17; Note, 36 Va. L. Rev. 84, 97 (1950). See
Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F. 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1946).
45. Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263, 266-267 (4th Cir. 1942) ; In re
Innis, 140 F. 2d 479, 480-481 (7th Cir. 1944) ; In re Stoller, 25 F. Supp. 226,
227 (S.D. N.Y. 1938) ; In re Harris, 28 F. 487, 488 (E.D. Ill. 1939) ; In rc
MfacGinnis, 50 F. Supp. 413, 414 (N.D. Cal. 1942).
46. Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F. 2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1946).
47. Gathany v. Bishop, 177 F. 2d 567, 568 (4th Cir. 1949).
48. See In re Marshall, 24 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1938).
49. Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F. 2d 425, 427 (10th Cir. 1942).
See Sword Line, Inc. v. Industrial Com'r of N. Y., 212 F. 2d 865, 870 (2d Cir.
1954) : "While injunction against state proceedings is undesirable, it is never-
theless recognized as necessary where preservation of federal dispositions in
bankruptcy and protection and enforcement of federal decrees in legal rehabili-
tation of corporations are necessary."
50. Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 1942) ; State Finance
Co. v. Morrow, 216 F. 2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1954) : "The Congress and the
courts have always recognized the power and the duty of the bankruptcy court
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Implementing this restrictive attitude, decisions have specifically
rejected the arguments of bankrupts that certain commonly re-
curring situations present sufficiently "unusual circumstances" to
justify action by the bankruptcy courts. Thus, the mere fact that
the creditor was taking steps to garnishee wages or enforce an
assignment of wages as a means of collecting a debt which the bank-
rupt claims to be dischargeable has several times been held not to be
grounds for the issuance of an injunction to restrain the creditor.51
It is reasoned that if the debt was actually discharged, the bankrupt
could have a state court declare the enforcement proceedings invalid.
The Hunt decision is distinguishable on the basis that there it was
affirmatively shown that the state rules erroneously held that the
liability survived the bankruptcy, and so the bankrupt's appeals to
the state courts would have been fruitless. Similarly, no relief was
given against the creditor's enforcement of a judgment obtained
as a result of a state court's having erroneously applied the state law
in ruling the debt not discharged. 52 Once again, the debtor's remedy
is said to have lain in an appeal to a higher state court to reverse the
erroneous trial court judgment. The fact that the bankrupt's failure
to defend in the state court was based on his honest belief that the
discharge operated automatically to release him from his debts has
been rejected as an adequate excuse for his resorting to the bank-
ruptcy court for relief, even in one instance when he had been ill-
advised by a Legal Aid Society consultant to ignore the creditor's
suit.r3 The bankrupt was simply charged with negligence in failing
to ascertain his legal rights correctly; and the Hunt case was dis-
tinguished on the ground that there the debtor had been alert
enough to seek injunctive relief while the creditor's action was still
pending in the state court. Nor was the threat of the bankrupt's
being imprisoned under a body execution for failing to satisfy the
creditor's judgment regarded as a serious enough invasion of the
debtor's rights to sustain interference by the bankruptcy court. 4
to grant any appropriate and necessary injunctive decree in furtherance or
in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
51. Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F. 2d 343 (2d Cir. 1946) ; It re Stoller,
25 F. Supp. 226 (S.D. N.Y. 1938) ; In re Harris, 28 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ill.
1939) ;I re Grover, 63 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1945). See In re Cox, 33
F. Supp. 796 (W.D. Ky. 1940) (proceedings before issuance of discharge, but
turned on same principles as post-discharge cases).
52. Csatari v. General Finance Corp., 173 F. 2d 798 (6th Cir. 1949);
In re Epstein, 46 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. N.Y. 1942). See In re Marshall, 24 F.
Supp. 1012, 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1938) (creditor's petition to enjoin bankrupt
from using discharge as a defense).
53. Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F. 2d 425 (10th Cir. 1942) ; In re
Innis 140 F. 2d 479 (7th Cir. 1944).
4. In re Devereaux, 76 F. 2d 522 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Csatari v. GeneralFinance Corp., 173 F. 2d 798 (6th Cir. 1949).
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Perhaps the most coldly technical attitude displayed by the courts is
found in the cases refusing to grant relief against the enforcement of
a creditor's judgment even though the bankrupt pleaded that he was
financially unable to carry an appeal to higher state courts to correct
the trial court's error in finding the debt non-dischargeable."" Ignor-
ing the fact that it is dealing with a man who has recently sur-
rendered his assets for distribution to his creditors, the same court
which presided over that proceeding takes the position that if a
remedy is legally available to the bankrupt in the regular judicial
processes of the state, then, even though he cannot afford to invoke
that remedy, he does not need the special protection of the bank-
ruptcy court.
In fact, the theme of all the decisions denying relief appears to be
that the bankrupt's remedy in the state courts is adequate if theoreti-
cally available-even if not practically available-and that the Hunt
case rule does not apply unless the state courts in which the bank-
rupt is sued would erroneously deny the dischargeability of the
obligation. In most of the opinions it is emphasized that the bankrupt
either had or could have appeared in a state court proceeding to
assert his discharge in defense, and could have appealed the adverse
decision to a higher state court, which would presumably have cor-
rected the lower court decision if it was in error--or the bankrupt
could have gone up to the United States Supreme Court by
certiorari. On this reasoning, a number of decisions have declared
that the principles of res judicata precluded the bankrupt from re-
litigating the issue of dischargeability in the bankruptcy court after
an adverse decision in a state court.58 Other courts have ruled that
in failing to assert his discharge as a defense in the state action, the
bankrupt was guilty of such gross negligence as to disqualify him-
self from the equitable relief which the bankruptcy court could grant
in proper circumstances.5 7 As an equity court, it could intervene to
prevent enforcement of a judgment of another court only if the
bankrupt's failure to assert his rights was due to fraud, accident, or
mistake not resulting from his own neglect.
55. Csatari v. General Finance Corp., 173 F. 2d 798 (6th Cir. 1949);
Otte v. Cooks, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 861 (D. Minn. 1953).
56. In re Devereaux, 76 F. 24 522 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Beneficial Loan Co.
v. Noble, 129 F. 2d 425 (10th Cir. 1942); Walters v. Wilson, 142 F. 2d
59 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Csatari v. General Finance Corp., 173 F. 2d 798 (6th Cir.
1949) ; In re Epstein, 48 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. N.Y. 1942) ; Otte v. Cooks, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 861 (D. Minn. 1953). See In re Kornblum, 22 F. Supp. 245,
247 (D. Minn. 1938) ; In re Cox, 33 F. Supp. 796, 798 (W.D. Ky. 1940);
In re Grover, 36 F. Supp. 644, 647 (D. Minn. 1945).
57. Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942) ; In re Innis, 140
F. 2d 479 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Gathany v. Bishopp, 177 F. 2d 567 (4th Cir. 1949).
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In cases granting relief, on the other hand, a broad construction
is placed on the principle of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt as not confining
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to cases of complete unavail-
ability of other remedies. 58 The courts extending protection to bank-
rupts have found circumstances justifying their action from a variety
of rather commonplace factors. Of course, injunctive relief is ac-
corded in situations like that of the Hunt case, where, contrary to
the general (and federal) law, the state rule makes the debt non-
dischargeable, so that an appeal through the state court system
would be futile.,9 However, one decision has extended the authority
of the Hunt rule to a case in which the bankrupt did not seek the
protection of the bankruptcy court until after the creditor had al-
ready obtained his judgment in the state court. 60 And several district
courts have further extended the Supreme Court's principle to
justify interference with the enforcement of a judgment when the
state court in sustaining the creditor's claim had erroneously applied
what was regarded by the bankruptcy court as the established law
of the state.81 More realistic attention is given to the fact that the
bankrupt has not the financial means to engage in extensive litiga-
tion to assert his rights and that the mere availability of a remedy
in the state courts does not adequately protect him if that remedy
58. This view is well expressed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Paul
in Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263, 268, 270 (4th Cir. 1942) : "But the right
to enjoin being established, the circumstances under which it may be exercised
are not confined to any definite and limited state of facts. The reported cases
show a tendency to enlarge rather than to restrict its use. In my opinion this
tendency is a wise and humane one and necessary to prevent nullification of
the beneficient purposes of the bankrupt law at the hands of ingenious and
grasping creditors. Certainly the right to an injunction is not barred merely
because the bankrupt might have fought the matter out in the state court.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt decided this." Also, State Finance Co. v. Morrow, 216
F. 2d 676 (10th Cir. 1954).
Judge Knight, of the Federal District Court for the Western District of
New York, has for many years been passing upon the requests of bankrupts to
determine the nature of specific debts and enjoin creditors' actions to enforce
debts found to be dischargeable. However, the opinions contain no reference
to the source of the court's jurisdiction nor to the considerations which make
the exercise of the jurisdiction necessary. In most of the cases, it does not
appear that the bankrupts have yet been discharged, but the proceedings are
not brought under § Ila for temporary stays but rather may be instituted by
"an Order to Show Cause," and they seek a permanent injunction against
enforcement of the debt. In re Kubiniec, 2 F. Supp. 632 (W.D. N.Y. 1932) ;
In re McCarthy, 8 F. Supp. 518 (W.D. N.Y. 1934) ; In re Ellman, 48 F.
Supp. 518 (W.D. N.Y. 1942) ; It re Carncross, 114 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. N.Y.
1953).
59. Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F. 2 189 (5th Cir. 1940).
60. In re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 115 F. 2d 189
(5th Cir. 1940).
61. In re Nichols, 22 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Ky. 1938) ; In re Patt, 43 F.
Supp. 754 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); In re Connors, 93 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ind.
1950).
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is prohibilitively expensive in relation to the amount of the debt.
Very recently, in State Finance Co. v. Morrow, the Court of Appeals
of the Tenth Circuit took occasion to observe: ".. . it is important to
bear in mind that the remedy afforded to the bankrupt by federal
law is not merely a legal remedy in the form of burdensome litiga-
tion with successive appeals to reach a count of record. It is a remedy
adequate to meet the full requirements of justice-a remedy which
comports with the spirit and purpose of the bankruptcy act to secure
to the bankrupt the full and complete benefits and advantages of
his discharge." 62
Frequently the opinions do not establish the "unusual circum-
stances" on any specific factor in the case, but rather justify the
bankruptcy court's action as necessary to prevent the bankrupt from
being subjected to "trouble, embarrassment, expense and possible
loss of employment,6 3 or to forestall "the continued oppression
of poor and inexperienced bankrupt debtors by the prosecution of
... dischargeable claims against them,"64 resulting in the creditor's
"virtually annulling [the] order of discharge by coercive meas-
ures. . ." 5 Thus do these courts disregard the possibility of a
theoretical remedy in the state courts, and instead emphasize the
practical hardships falling on bankrupts if they are left to their
own resources in defending against claims after bankruptcy and the
unfairness of allowing an aggressive creditor to collect debts by
deliberately ignoring the discharge which other creditors have
observed in good faith.°6
62. 216 F. 2d 676, 680 (10th Cir. 1954). An injunction was there issued
against the prosecution of a creditor's action in a justice of the peace court on
a note given by the bankrupt for repayment of a loan. The federal court found
that the debt on the note was discharged and reasoned that the bankrupt should
not be left to the uncertain remedy of pleading the discharge as a defense, be-
cause "the court in which the liability was asserted was not a court of record
where issues of law and fact are defined with any degree of particularity, and
f.. or all practical purposes the bankrupt was defenseless." Manifesting a
similar practical approach to the question are: In re Cleapor, 16 F. Supp. 481
(N.D. Ga. 1936) ; In re Connors, 93 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ind. 1950) ; III re
Zilliox (S.D. Cal. 1953), 28 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 92 (1954).
63. This language was first employed in Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v.
Ottinger, 50 F. 2d 856, 859 (4th Cir. 1931), decided three years prior to Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt and relied on heavily by the Supreme Court in the Hunt
case. Among later cases containing this or very similar language in the
opinions are: Holmes v. Rowe, 97 F. 2d 537 (9th Cir. 1938) ; It re Caldwell,
33 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ga. 1940) ; In re Patt, 43 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Tenn.
1941).
64. In re Taylor, 29 F. Supp. 656, 657 (N.D. Ga. 1939). Similar ex-
pressions appear in: In re Nichols, 22 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Ky. 1938) ; It rc
Connors, 93 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ind. 1950).
65. In re Cleapor, 16 F. Supp. 481, 484 (N.D. Ga. 1936). See dissent in
Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263, 268, 269 (4th Cir. 1942).
66. See Evans v. Dearborn Machinery Movers Co., 200 F. 2d 125, 127(6th Cir. 1952) ; In re Walton, 51 F. Supp. 857, 859 (W.D. Mo. 1943).
The conflicting attitudes of judges favoring and those opposing the extra-
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The debtor's chances of receiving protection from the bank-
ruptcy court definitely appear to be stronger if he has refrained
from appearing to defend in the enforcement proceedings brought
by the creditor, for then he avoids being in the unfavorable position
of asking the bankruptcy court to relitigate an actually contested
issue already determined by a state court. The safest procedure is
for the debtor to seek injunctive relief while the creditor's suit is still
being prosecuted against him,67 but he may also be successful in
barring an execution on a default judgment.6 In at least four in-
stances, however, injunctions have been issued against the enforce-
ment of the creditor's state court judgment even after the bankrupt
had appeared in the state suit to assert his bankruptcy as a defense. 69
In spite of strong opinion to the contrary,70 therefore, the principle
of res judicata can be turned aside in the face of special circum-
ordinary relief to bankrupts are sharply presented in Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.
2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942), where the majority (consisting of two circuit judges)
denied relief to a bankrupt who had, through a natural misunderstanding,
failed to plead his discharge in a state court action in which discharge would
have constituted a complete defense to the creditor's claim. The majority
judges, having ruled that the debtor disqualified himself from relief by his
own "gross negligence," declared: "Accordingly, while we are fully cog-
nizant of the present unfortunate predicament of Holmes, the dictates of
orderly administration in bankruptcy proceedings must prevail in this situa-
tion, which is fraught with danger." Id. at 267. The dissent (consisting of a
district judge) vigorously protested against this unimaginative approach to
the problems, expounded upon the disadvantages under which the average
bankrupt labors, and concluded: "Every court which deals with any con-
siderable number of bankruptcy cases is familiar with the difficulties which
bankrupts have in protecting themselves from rapacious creditors even after
discharge. . . The conditions above recited do not in themselves embody
any legal principles, as I am well aware. But they are factual realities which
exist to a greater or less degree in every district and which have become so
prevalent in some communities as to amount to a practical nullification of the
Bankruptcy Act." Id. at 268, 269.
67. Evans v. Dearborn Machinery Movers Co., 200 F. 2d 125 (6th Cir.
1952) ; In rc Cleapor, 16 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Ga. 1936) ; In re Henry, 46 F.
Supp. 536 (W.D. N.Y. 1942); lit re Walton, 51 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo.
1943).
6§. lit re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ga. 1936) ; In re Taylor, 29 F.
Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga. 1939) ; In re Zilliox (S.D. Cal. 1953), 28 J. N. A. Ref.
Bankr. 92 (1954). See lit re Buzas, 58 F. Supp. 717 (N.D. Cal. 1944), where
the court took jurisdiction at the bankrupt's request for an injunction, but
decided that the debt was non-dischargeable and therefore refused to grant
the injunction. In a number of cases enjoining enforcement of judgments,
the opinions do not indicate whether the debtor appeared in the state court.
69. Holmes v. Rowe, 97 F. 2d 537 (9th Cir. 1938) (default judgment
obtained, but later attempts was made by bankrupt in state court to have thejudgment canceled); Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, 115 F. 2d 189 (5th
Cir. 1941) (bankrupt sought stay in state court before discharge, on ground
debt was dischargeable, but judgment was entered for creditor); In re
Nichols, 22 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Ky. 1938) (same) ; In re Connors, 93 F.
Supp. 149 (N.D. Ind. 1950) (bankrupt pleaded discharge in pending suit but
judgment was entered for creditor).
70. See cases cited note 56 supra. Also 7 Remington, Bankruptcy § 3438;
Note, 18 Brooklyn L. Rev. 271, 282 (1952).
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stances dictating that the bankrupt be relieved from a state court
order mistakenly ruling a debt non-dischargeable. Thus, the circuit
court of appeals in Holmes v. Rowe declared: "Nor do we con-
sider that the failure of the appellee to exhaust his remedies in the
state court would preclude the District Court from exercising its
jurisdiction in the matter. . . . 'The fundamental question involved
is the effect of the discharge in bankruptcy upon the debt .... The
question may be decided by either state or federal court according to
state law, but the bankruptcy court has primary and superior juris-
diction to determine the effect of its own decree of discharge, and
it may exercise, or refuse to exercise, that jurisdiction according to
the exigencies of the case.' ,7
Granting that there are two sides to this question and that not
all creditors have black souls nor all bankrupts pure hearts, this
writer definitely inclines to the point of view that the bankruptcy
courts should be readily available to afford broad protection to
debtors against the efforts of creditors to enforce discharged claims.
Leaving the determination of the dischargeability of specific debts
strictly to any court in which the creditor may choose to proceed
tends to defeat both of the basic purposes of the bankruptcy system
-release of the debtor from his obligations and equal treatment
of creditors with provable claims.
As the more sympathetic courts have pointed out repeatedly,
bankrupts, not being able to protect themselves, are all too fre-
quently coerced into paying discharged obligations. 72 Misunder-
standing the import of a discharge order, they are commonly un-
aware of the necessity of defending actions brought by creditors
to collect debts.73 Often, the creditor's post-bankruptcy maneuver
is in the form of the sudden prosecution of a suit filed before the
adjudication and allowed to remain unnoticed on the court's docket
until after the debtor has been lulled into a false sense of security by
obtaining his discharge.7 4 Financially unable to bear heavy expenses
71. Holmes v. Rowe, 97 F. 2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1938) citinq Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt, and quoting Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger.
72. See Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, 50 F. 2d 856, 859 (4th
Cir. 1931) ; fi re Home Discount Co., 147 Fed. 538, 552 (N.D. Ala. 1906) ;
In re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631, 635 (N.D. Ga. 1940) ; In re Connors, 93 F.
Supp. 149, 150 (N.D. Ind. 1950).
73. See cases cited note 53 supra. Also, discussions in In re Zilliox
(S.D. Cal. 1953), 28 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 92 (1954), and Note, 18 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 271, 277 (1952).
74. Holmes v. Rowe, 97 F. 2d 537 (9th Cir. 1938) (suit filed before
bankruptcy, default judgment obtained 22 years later, after discharge and
without notice to bankrupt) ; In re Innis, 140 F. 2d 479 (7th Cir. 1944) (suit
filed before bankruptcy, default judgment obtained 4%/ years later, 3Y2 years
after discharge and without notice to bankrupt) ; Gathany v. Bishopp, 177
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which may be incurred in extensive litigation, the bankrupt is surely
in no position to meet the extreme requirement that he resist the
creditor all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States, if
necessary.7 5 If the debtor has come into substantial assets since his
discharge and if the claim sought to be enforced is a large one, then
he may find it worthwhile to carry the fight into the state courts.
But it seems obvious that the amount of the resources of the bank-
rupt and the size the debt in issue should not be the factors determin-
ing whether a particular individual is to enjoy the benefits which the
Bankruptcy Act is intended to make available to all honest debtors.
Denying the right of the bankruptcy courts to interfere tends
to give the unscrupulous creditor a chance to impose unfairly not
only on the bankrupt but also on the other creditors.76 A creditor
who is willing to take advantage of the ignorance, inexperience and
poverty of the bankrupt by threatening him with legal action and
by endangering his job through harassment of his employer with
garnishment proceedings77 may obtain full satisfaction of his claim
while the other creditors with more humane instincts receive only a
few dollars in liquidation dividends. Because of his expectation of
F. 2d 567 (4th Cir. 1949) (judgment obtained before bankruptcy, assigned
and revived by assignee 9 years after discharge, and filed as claim against de-
ceased bankrupt's estate 3 years later-more than 12 years after discharge) ;
In re Epstein, 48 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. N.Y. 1942) (judgment obtained 8 years
before bankruptcy, no attempt to execute until after discharge).
75. It re Devereaux, 76 F. 2d 522 (2d Cir. 1935), the decision more
responsible than any other for the move to restrict to narrow limits the juris-
diction recognized in the Hunt case, expressly sanctioned this absurdity.
76. "The [creditor], claiming to know facts that would have precluded
a discharge, concealed such facts to the end that it might have an advantage
over other creditors after the discharge was granted. It sought to make itself
a privileged creditor by concealing information that it was bound under the
law to disclose and thus give it an opportunity against the earnings of the
bankrupt, the debts of all other creditors having been discharged. The
[creditor] has acted in bad faith .... " In re Walton, 51 F. Supp. 857, 859
(W.D. Mo. 1943). Evans v. Dearborn Machinery Movers Co., 200 F. 2d
125, 127 (6th Cir. 1952) : Referring particularly to reorganization proceedings,
the bankruptcy court "declared that the bankrupt's interests were not alone
to be considered but that the efforts of many persons to salvage an otherwise
defunct organization were of transcendent importance."
The Walton case held the creditor to be estopped by his failure to carry
out his "statutory duty" to object to the granting of a discharge. Contra on
this point: In re Anthony, 42 F. Supp. 312, 315 (E.D. I1. 1951).
77. Experience has impressed on some courts (most notably in the
Northern District of Georgia) the danger of a debtor's being discharged by
an employer who is subjected to garnishment proceedings by a creditor. It is
frequently less trouble to find a new employee than to bother with the with-
holding of wages under a garnishment order. Quite obviously, the threat of
the loss of his job is an acutely potent extortion weapon against a bankrupt
who has recently surrendered his assets to his creditors and has only his cur-
rent earnings on which to live. See Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger, 50
F. 2d 856, 859 (4th Cir. 1931) ; It re Cleapor, 16 F. Supp. 481, 483 (N.D.
Ga. 1936) ; Strasburger, The Wage Assignment Problem, 19 Minn. L. Rev.
536 (1935).
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circumventing a discharge in bankruptcy, such a scheming creditor
is encouraged to extend credit recklessly, thereby contributing to the
original financial downfall of the unwary debtor and saddling the
loss on the more ethical claimants against the insolvent estate.
78
There is some indication that the referees and district judges,
who deal first-hand with the unfortunate debtor and the grasping
creditor, see the true fundamentals of the situation more clearly
than do the judges who merely read the briefs and hear the formal
arguments of attorneys in appeals. 79 The latter jurists may be in
danger of basing their conclusions on the dictates of cold legal logic
rather than on the demands of warm human misfortunes. This
may explain the fact that while on several occasions the district
courts have granted relief to bankrupts only to be reversed by the
appellate courts,8 0 no case has been found in which the lower court
was reversed for failing to grant relief.
It seems obvious that the bankruptcy courts are in better posi-
tion than the multitudinous state tribunals to pass on the issues of
dischargeability of debts. 8 ' They are necessarily better versed in
bankruptcy law, not only in knowledge of its specific provisions but
also in understanding of its general purposes. Also, they are more
familiar with the bankrupt's affairs, the nature of the claims against
him and the attitude of the creditor toward the bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Quite possibly the bankruptcy court will already have passed
on the dischargeability of the debt in question on a Section 1la
motion for a temporary stay of the creditor's suit. In every case, if
the creditor has proved his claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, there
will be some evidence before the court as to the origin and nature
78. "If creditors were as diligent in investigating the responsibility of
an applicant for a loan or a purchase under a conditional sales contract before
making the loan or sale, as they are in attempting to collect after the indebted-
ness has been incurred, there would be fewer cases in bankruptcy and the
losses incurred in trade would be greatly reduced." In re Nichols, 22 F.
Supp. 694, 695 (W.D. Ky. 1938). Also In re Caldwell, 33 F. Supp. 631, 635
(N.D. Ga. 1940). In re Patt, 43 F. Supp. 754, 755 (E.D. Tenn. 1941), re-
ferring to this situation, utters a truly historic observation: "This court feels
that such conduct does not conform to the best business ethics nor is it in line
with governmental righteousness."
79. See, for example, impressive exposition of: District Judge Paul,
dissenting in Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263, 268, 269 (4th Cir. 1942) ; Judge
Underwood in In re Cleapor, 16 F. Supp. 482, 483-484 (N.D. Ga. 1936) ;
Referee Brink in In re Zilliox (S.D. Cal. 1953), 28 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 92
(1954).
80. In re Devereaux, 76 F. 2d 522 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Helms v. Holmes,
129 F. 2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942) ; Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F. 2d 425
(10th Cir. 1942) ; In re Innis, 140 F. 2d 479 (7th Cir. 1944). See Ciavarella
v. Salituri, 153 F. 2d 343 (2d Cir. 1946) (bankruptcy court decided case on
merits against bankrupt, but appellate court denied jurisdiction of bankruptcy
court to decide the case).
81. See Coleman, supra note 6; Nadler, supra note 1. at 78.
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of the debtor's liability, whereas in a state court suit, the proof of
these factors will have to be submitted all over again . 2 Furthermore,
the debtor is already acquainted with the bankruptcy court and natu-
rally expects it to deal with all matters concerning his case."2
If bankruptcy courts do undertake to extend the exercise of their
jurisdiction to effectuate the discharge, some delay in the administra-
tion of bankrupt estates will inevitably be occasioned by the diver-
sion of the courts' attention from the business of collecting assets
and paying claims.8 4 This factor probably furnishes the most per-
suasive argument for leaving the issue of dischargeability of par-
ticular debts to the state courts. What is necessary, however, is a
balancing of the demands of efficient administration for the estate
and of adequate protection for the bankrupt. Since the impression
seems to exist that bankruptcy courts are more inclined to hold
debts to be discharged, creditors might in time learn not to try to
enforce claims unjustifiably if the bankruptcy court's interference
were assumed to be forthcoming, and thus the burden on those
courts would be kept within bounds. Further, if creditors' chances
of collecting debts after discharge were reduced, they might be more
alert to object to the granting of discharges, and thereby some un-
deserving bankrupts would properly be prevented from wrongly
obtaining the benefits of bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
If it can be agreed that the existing situation is not entirely satis-
factory, the final question is, what steps can be taken to work im-
provements. Several alternatives may be suggested. First, the Su-
preme Court could take advantage of the first opportunity to clarify
its views as to the scope of the phase of the bankruptcy courts'
jurisdiction here under discussion. Of course, no acceptable defini-
tive rule can possibly be laid down to cover all cases, though some
writers have expressed the opinion that the courts should make a
better attempt to do so. s5 Some flexibility must be retained, for if the
bankruptcy courts were bound to pass on every petition for injunc-
tive relief which a bankrupt might see fit to file, those courts could be
used by a debtor to vex a creditor who had proceeded in good faith
in a state court on full notice to the bankrupt to enforce a liability
actually not dischargeable. However, the Supreme Court could
82. See Twinem, supra note 12, at 34.
83. See dissenting opinion, Helms v. Holms, 129 F. 2d 263, 268, 269
(4th Cir. 1942) ; Nadler, supra note 1, at 78.
84. See Helms v. Holmes, 129 F. 2d 263, 267 (4th Cir. 1942).
85. Notes, 18 Brooklyn L. Rev. 271, 286 (1952) ; 36 Va. L. Rev. 84, 87
(1950).
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take occasion to declare that the "unusual circumstances" concept
of Local Loan Co. v. Hunt is to be liberally interpreted to include
any situation in which a bankruptcy court finds that a creditor is
employing coercive tactics to harass a bankrupt who is financially
or mentally unable to preserve for himself the benefits of his dis-
charge. 1 This is, in actual fact, the manner in which some sym-
pathetic courts are applying their authority derived from the Hunt
case, and possibly these courts and similarly-minded referees will
gradually extend the exercise of this jurisdiction until it becomes
so commonplace that all courts will fall into line.
A second reform could come from state legislation designed to
afford bankrupts better protection in the state courts. Some form of
simplified procedure is needed for nullifying judgments which
creditors may obtain on dischargeable debts by default, through the
debtors' unintentional or ill-advised failure to plead discharges in
defense. Several states, including New York, California and Minne-
sota, have statutes looking to this end,8 7 but they do not provide a
sufficient remedy for the bankrupt. For example, relief is not avail-
able until a year after the discharge, and during that time creditors
have proceeded with garnishments and other means of collecting
debts unjustifiably. 88 Further, the bankrupt must still go to the ex-
pense of employing counsel to assert his rights under these statutes,
a burden which he may be unable to bear.89 Perhaps some of this
financial incapacity may be obviated by requiring the creditor to give
security for the payment of the bankrupt's expenses of litigation if
the claim sought to be enforced is ultimately proved to be dis-
charged. 0
86. See Twinem, supra note 12, at 34.
87. N. Y. Debtor and Creditor Law § 150: "At any time after one year
has elapsed since a bankrupt was discharged from his debts.., the bankrupt
.. may apply, upon proof of the bankrupt's discharge, to the court in which
the judgment was rendered against him... for an order, directing the judg-
ment to be cancelled and discharged of record." Very similar provisions ap-
pear in: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 675(b) (1953) ; Minn. Stat. § 548.18 (1953).
88. See In re Stoller, 25 F. Supp. 226 (S.D. N.Y. 1938) ; In re Epstein,
48 F. Supp. 436 (S.D. N.Y. 1942); In re Grover, 63 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn.
1945). This difficulty could be solved by granting the bankrupt a temporary
stay against prosecution of a pending suit, under the authority of § lla, and
making the stay extend for twelve months after the discharge (although § Ila
does not specifically provide for such extension). See In re Partnow, 19 F.
Supp. 690 (E.D. N.Y. 1937).
89. It may be argued that the problem of persons who cannot afford
adequate legal counsel to protect their rights is a general one, and that the
law need not make special provision for one class of such unfortunates-the
bankrupts. See Note 36 Va. L. Rev. 84, 98 (1950). However, in one sense
bankrupts do constitute a special class, because the law has accorded judicial
recognition to their poverty, and their financial affairs have already been put
in the hands of a court.
90. See Note, 36 Va. L. Rev. 84, 98 (1950).
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The most effective and obvious procedure for insuring the bank-
rupt the benefits of his discharge lies in revision of the Bankruptcy
Act. Section 17 could easily be amended to specify that a discharge
shall be issued only in general terms and that the court has no power
to insert qualifications in the order to exempt specific debts. Section
1la could be revised to provide that the temporary stay of state
court proceedings pending against the debtor should extend for one
year after discharge, so that the protection would continue during
the interval before state statutes provide the bankrupt with a means
of setting aside judgments obtained on discharged debts. Also, this
same section could be made to accord express power to the bank-
ruptcy courts to grant permanent injunctions against the enforce-
ment of any liability it determines to be dischargeable.91 Such a
provision would have the effect of giving direct legislative sanction
to the Hunt case. Finally some means might be devised to give the
discharge the effect of automatically extinguishing dischargeable
liabilities, unless the bankrupt affirmatively and expressly waives his
defense of discharge in regard to a particular obligation. By such
simple means the practices of the different bankruptcy courts could
be rendered more nearly uniform and more effective in achieving
the basic objectives of the Bankruptcy Act.
91. In re Sutton, 19 F. Supp. 892, 894 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) suggests that
§ Ia ".... strongly implies that a creditor will not be stayed beyond the date
of the bankrupt's discharge."
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